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 ■
A Persistent Danger:
Unexploded Ordnance in Populated Areas
What Gets Left Behind 
Whenever a weapon is fired, dropped, launched, or 
projected, there is always a chance it will not explode 
and become an UXO. This chance (known as the “failure 
rate”) is highest when a munition’s fuse fails due to 
age, design flaws, or human error during the fusing 
procedure. But the environment where a munition 
is used is also a key factor. Failure rates provided by 
arms manufacturers are typically based on a munition’s 
performance in ideal conditions – which are far from the 
reality of urban warfare.1 Indeed, a review by the United 
States Army after the conflict with the Islamic State in 
Iraq found that, “In Mosul, building construction (old 
and new) within the city centre presented challenging 
munitions survivability issues, mainly due to use of high-
pressure concrete, steel reinforcement, and multiple 
stories; munitions survivability in terms of fusing and 
body construction in some instances did not meet the 
desired effect.” The research found that this “created a 
follow-on force hazard of unexploded ordnance,”2 which 
could be repurposed by other armed actors, cause harm 
to civilians, and impede relief efforts.
During and after conflicts, UXO can be found all around 
towns and cities: on roads, in school yards, surrounding 
houses and hospitals, and in many other places where 
people carry out their daily activities. The presence of 
UXO can block access to food, water, and other basic 
needs, and obstruct civilians’ access to education or 
medical care. This contamination may drive people from 
their homes, prevent the return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons, and hamper the delivery of principled 
humanitarian aid.  
UXO are especially dangerous for those civilians – 
particularly children – who do not recognize them as a 
threat. External efforts to educate the population about 
this danger may not always be effective, especially 
when hostilities are ongoing and humanitarian access is 
limited. 
If left undiscovered or unaddressed, the threat posed 
by UXO in populated areas can persist for years – and 
even generations. UXO are still regularly found in urban 
areas of Europe affected by the First and Second World 
1. See, for example: International Committee of the Red Cross, “Weapon Contamination in Urban Settings: An ICRC Response,” July 2019; and 
Jacqueline MacDonald and Carmen Mendez, “Unexploded Ordnance Cleanup Costs: Implications of Alternative Protocols,” RAND Corporation, 
2005. 
2. United States Army, “Mosul Study Group: What the Battle for Mosul Teaches the Force,” September 2017, P. 57. https://www.armyupress.
army.mil/Portals/7/Primer-on-Urban-Operation/Documents/Mosul-Public-Release1.pdf.
Wars. And as the materials used to create these weapons 
degrade over time, the likelihood of accidental detonation 
increases. 
When UXO do explode, they can cause casualties and 
serious damage to infrastructure. UXO with large explosive 
payloads are especially devastating due to the large blast 
or fragmentation radius they create. This harm is further 
magnified in urban areas, where debris from surrounding 
structures (such as metal, glass, and cement fragments) can 
create a deadly wave of secondary fragmentation.
Clearance at Great Cost
UXO are cleared using a procedure known as battle 
area clearance (BAC). When done in open areas, BAC is 
relatively simple: Teams of deminers walking over an area 
can readily detect ordnance, using visual inspection or 
metal detectors, and remove it. Any UXO that are not safe 
to move are destroyed where they are found. But when 
UXO contaminate populated areas, BAC becomes far more 
complex, time-consuming, and costly. And the risk that 
UXO will not be found before causing casualties increases 
significantly.
In populated areas, the built environment dramatically 
increases the amount of area that must be searched 
for UXO, with each floor of a building a potentially 
contaminated area. Deep wells and drains where UXO 
become lodged may require excavation. Structures that 
were damaged by ordnance during conflict may have UXO 
inside them, and must therefore be searched thoroughly. 
Where the damage to such structures is significant, it 
may not be safe to conduct clearance without enlisting 
specialised engineers and armour-plated heavy machinery, 
which is costly to purchase and operate. All too often, the 
damage is so severe that demolishing the structure and 
handing back a mound of cleared rubble to its owner is the 
only safe option.  
The lack of reliable strike data in many conflict areas 
further complicates the BAC process. If such data is not 
collected by armed actors, or not shared with mine action 
organizations, then it will be impossible to guarantee that 
areas are free from UXO without a complete inspection.  
The United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Network on Explosive 
Weapons have convincingly documented that the use of explosive weapons (especially those with wide area 
effects) in populated areas (EWIPA) creates an unacceptably high risk of indiscriminate harm. As humanitarian 
mine action organizations working in urban environments, we see this harm being done in numerous conflict 
zones every day.
Discussion of the harm caused by EWIPA typically focuses on the immediate effects of these weapons when they 
explode, as well as reverberating effects leading to displacement; damage to vital services such as healthcare, 
water, and electricity; long-term psychological harm; and so on. But what of those weapons that, once launched, 
do not explode? These items, known as unexploded ordnance (UXO), are an insidious threat that can afflict 
civilians for generations. Any political declaration aiming to reduce the impact of EWIPA must therefore take UXO 
into account.
Humanity & Inclusion, 2020  —  Websites:  www.hi.org, www.maginternational.org, and www.npaid.org
The complexity of BAC in urban areas makes the process 
extremely costly. Indeed, mine action organizations 
working in Iraq estimate that clearance of UXO in urban 
settings is six times more expensive than similar work 
done in rural areas.11
The time required to conduct urban UXO clearance, and 
the limited resources available for it, further increases the 
risk of civilian death, injury, and economic loss. Civilians 
returning to an area before it is cleared may attempt to 
dispose of UXO themselves, causing it to explode; or 
accidentally detonate it during reconstruction or repairs.
As members of the International Network on Explosive 
Weapons (INEW), we believe that an international 
political declaration on explosive weapons in populated 
areas must commit states to:12
 ■ Develop operational policies and procedures that will 
stop the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects 
in populated areas;
 ■ Recognise the rights of direct and indirect victims and 
provide adequate assistance to their needs;
 ■ Support and undertake data gathering including data on 
victims disaggregated by sex and age;
 ■ Enable humanitarian and protection measures;
 ■ Build a community of practice, including through regular 
meetings to discuss the issue and progress towards 
reducing harm; and
 ■ Share positive practice and experiences.
To reduce the effects of UXO in populated areas, we 
further recommend that the political declaration commit 
states to:
 ■ Collect, retain, and share data on the use of explosive 
weapons, and continually improve such data collection in 
line with best practice. This includes:
 – Using battle damage assessments and other tools 
that comprehensively record direct and indirect strikes, 
including the date/location of the strike, the type/quantity 
of munitions used, and any civilian casualties which may 
have resulted
 – Employing tools that attempt to distinguish between 
strike locations where ordnance has definitively exploded 
and strike locations where UXO may be present (treating 
all cluster munition strikes as potential UXO locations).
 – Consistently sharing such strike records with 
national mine action authorities (or other responsible 
agencies), the United Nations, and non-governmental 
organisations, to facilitate rapid and efficient survey, 
clearance, risk education, and assistance to survivors.
 ■ Provide comprehensive humanitarian assistance 
(including mine action activities such as survey, clearance, 
risk education, and victim assistance) in conflict-affected 
areas; or provide all necessary assistance to United 
Nations and non-governmental organizations with the 
capacity to do so.
 ■ Ensure that victims – including injured persons, 
survivors, family members of people killed and/or injured, 
and communities damaged by conflict – receive adequate 
assistance based on their needs in a non-discriminatory 
manner. This should include emergency medical care, 
physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support and socio-
economic inclusion, as well as support towards the full 
realisation of survivors’ rights and their full participation in 
society.
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The city of Sinjar, in northern Iraq, was devastated 
during conflict with the Islamic State in 2014. 
Innumerable weapons with wide area effects were 
deployed in the city, including 500 pound bombs, 120 
mm mortars, conventional and improvised projectiles, 
and anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature 
– hundreds of which were left behind after conflict.3 
Roughly 70 percent of the Sinjar’s housing stock was 
destroyed,4 along with large parts of the city hospital,5 
schools, the primary water tank,6 and government 
buildings such as the local land registry. Nearly 67 
percent of Sinjar’s road network was also rendered 
unusable by the conflict.7 While some structures were 
specifically targeted by the Islamic State (including 
religious sites belonging to the Yazidi community),  
the subsequent bombardment caused large-scale 
destruction with reverberating effects. So much so that 
Sinjar: A City in Pieces
more than five years after fighting stopped, and after more 
than 2,200 hours of work by humanitarian mine action 
agencies,8 much of the city remains uninhabitable and 
thousands of residents have yet to return.
“I was really sad when I saw our house totally 
destroyed and turned into ruins. I felt lost and afraid 
because my family and I hoped to find a sanctuary 
after all we went through during displacement.” – 
Aryan, Sinjar9
“When we first returned back home we realized that 
everything was gone; that nothing was the same 
as it used to be… Every square meter that I clear is 
as important to me as clearing my own house and 
property. I consider all of this city my land and all of 
its people like my family.” – Jihan, Sinjar10
